agency problem是什么意思？

1. agency problem是什么意思？

就是代理问题的意思。
什么是代理问题呢？股东如果自己经营企业，就不存在这个问题。但如果是请别人来经营，那么他请的总经理就是代理人，是代理这个股东来经营企业的。由于企业不是该总经理的，因此他的利益与股东的利益不可能完全一致，甚至为了个人利益有可能使股东利益造成损失。这就是所谓的代理问题。企业的治理结构设计就是为了解决代理问题的

2. 新加坡 尤金简介

尤今，新加坡女作家，原名谭幼今。出生于马来西亚北部一个美丽的城市怡保。以写游记小说见长，作品风格细腻，真实，真诚，真挚地反映了现实生活里的人，现实生活里的事，与三毛有完全不同的写法，更关注现实人生。主要作品有《沙漠中的小白屋》《迷失的雨季》《那一份遥远的情》《浪漫之旅》《太阳不肯回去》《尤今小说精编》等。

扩展资料：尤金作品获得的奖项：
1991年，尤今获颁第一届《新华文学奖》。
1996年，尤今荣获第一届《万宝龙----国大艺术中心文学奖》。
尤今的作品，散见于新加坡、台湾、中国、香港、马来西亚、泰国、美国、欧洲等报刊杂志。
尤今现为新加坡《联合早报》撰写专栏文章。
迄今为止，尤今在国内国外出版的作品共有110多部。这些作品当中，有40多部是在新加坡出版的，另60多部分别在中国和台湾地区出版。

3. 尤金的昙花里的问题

1.因为整颗心,都去了昙花那儿,心情有点儿焦躁,有点儿兴奋,又有点儿不安(文章第三段) 2.为昙花一现是瞬间的浓郁强烈做铺垫 3.拟人,作用我也不会写~ 4.凄美只它生命最短,在风光无限好的时刻,它的大限到来,迅速萎谢,壮烈指它尽情的享受人间蜂拥而来得爱,辉煌的来,辉煌而去,不曾浪费一点一滴
我用手机打的字啊。。。。网上根本没有这样题目的答案，我在想我们是不是一个学校的，甚至一个班的？

4. what is agency problem? how to limite the extent of the agency problem??

这是有关组织机构设置的一个专用名词，你看了下面的解释就清楚了。如何解决的内容也有了：

Agency problem 
Also sometimes referred to as the principal-agent problem. The difficult but extremely important and recurrent organizational design problem of how organizations can structure incentives so that people (“agents”) who are placed in control over resources that are not their own with a contractual obligation to use these resources in the interests of some other person or group of people actually will perform this obligation as promised — instead of using their delegated authority over other people's resources to feather their own nests at the expense of those whose interests they are supposed to be serving (their “principals”). Enforcing such contracts will involve transaction costs (often referred to as agency costs), and these costs may sometimes be very high indeed.

Directors, managers and employees of business corporations are supposed to use their delegated authority to maximize the total financial returns from the business to its owners, the shareholders. Physicians, nurses, clinical psychologists, teachers, lawyers, CPAs, financial advisors and other service-oriented professionals are supposed to use their specialized knowledge and skills solely in the best interests of the patients, students or clients who have placed themselves (and some of their resources) in professional hands in exchange for the professionals' promises to act on their behalf. Government officials, judges and politicians in countries embracing the concept of popular sovereignty are instructed to use the power granted them to make public policy decisions that further some reasonable concept of “the public interest” (usually conceived as the common interests of their constituents or of the country's citizenry at large). Trustees, managers, and employees of non-profit charitable institutions are supposed to use their control over their organization and its resources to promote the general purposes for which the institution was chartered and endowed. Yet if agents are really to perform consistently in the manner they are supposed to do (that is, in the interests of other people), they will need to be suitably motivated by some combination of material incentives, moral incentives, and/or coercive incentives that will make it seem worth their while to attend faithfully to their service obligations and fiduciary duties. The more autonomy that agents have to have in order to do their particular kind of work effectively and efficiently, the less useful coercive sanctions are likely to be, and the more important it becomes for agents' moral and material incentives to be appropriately aligned with their broader obligations to their principals. That is, organizations need to be structured in such a way so the agent will expect that diligently serving the interests of his or her principals will also be in his or her own long-run best interests. In order to accomplish this, the principals need to be reasonably clever in setting up the initial rules of the game that are set in the employment contract, sufficiently vigilant in keeping track of their agents' quality of performance over time, and willing to bear at least some minimum level of “agency costs” in order to provide the necessary incentives. 

Examples of some techniques commonly used to overcome or alleviate the agency problem would include: (1) profit-sharing bonuses, contingency fees, sales commissions, merit raises, executive stock options and various other contractually specified methods of setting the amount of the agent's financial compensation in proportion to measurable results; (2) organizational hiring and promotion policies for people in responsible positions (agents) that emphasize identifying and selecting candidates whose reputation (based ideally on past performance) indicate they are “well-motivated,” “dedicated to the ethics of the profession,” and generally “of good character” — i.e., people who feel a strong sense of moral obligation to do their best to do what they have promised to do, even when no one is likely to be watching; (3) institutional arrangements of accountability (such as boards of directors, auditing committees, inspector generals' offices, professional society ethics committees, and government regulatory boards) for detecting and then punishing extreme dereliction of duty, either by simply firing and disgracing (or perhaps de-licensing) the unworthy agent or possibly by aggressively pursuing civil or criminal penalties through the courts; (4) arrangements such as elections whereby the recent performance of the agent may be periodically scrutinized by his or her principals and competing candidates for the job may be allowed to make their case for replacing the incumbent agent by revealing his or her shortcomings and showing how performance might be improved through a change in command.

The bottom line, however, is that the agency problem can never be 100% solved in a world where virtually everyone has a healthy regard for their own self-interest and the relevant information for evaluating performance is imperfect, costly to obtain and unequally distributed between the agent and his principals. Indeed, rational principals will only pursue the available techniques for control to the point that the marginal increment in “agency costs” rise to equal the marginal benefits to them of the additional increment in “faithfulness” that they produce. (That is to say, sometimes it is cheaper for principals to endure a certain amount of dereliction of duty by their agents than it is to pay for the precautions needed to prevent or punish it.) In some kinds of institutions — especially those where results are not readily measurable with much precision, those where the nature of the agents' work is such as to require a very high degree of expert judgment, those where lines of responsibility and authority are very complex, those where agents work individually in widely dispersed work places, those where the agent's activities necessarily involve a lot of “judgment calls” to cope with rapidly changing circumstances and highly uncertain information, and those where large numbers of principals have only relatively small individual “stakes” at risk — the incentives for agents faithfully to represent their principals may easily become so weak as to be largely ineffective. Experience demonstrates that these kinds of organizations often come to be run mainly for the benefit of the agents (managers and other employees, service professionals, politicians, officials) rather than their purported principals (stockholders, voters, taxpayers, clients, etc.). Two of the important tasks of the academic disciplines of business administration and public administration are to identify, and then to devise cheaper substitutes or remedies for, organizational arrangements that are characterized by costly agency problems.

5. 尤金简介

有一个是地区，一个是人名：
尤今：
尤今，原名谭幼今。出生于马来西亚，成长于新加坡。毕业于南洋大学中文系，获荣誉学士学位。先服务于国家图书馆，后到南洋商报任记者和副刊编辑，现执教于某初级学院。 
  尤今酷爱旅游，至今足迹已遍及亚、非、欧、美、澳及北极圈的80多个国家和地区。 
  尤今酷爱写作，至今已出版小说、散文、小品、游记、报告文学等135多部图书。其中62部在新加坡出版，73部在中国大陆、台湾、香港等地出版。 
尤金：
 美国俄勒冈州西南部的城市。在威拉米特河上游，塞勒姆南100公里处。人口10.2万（1984）。1846年开始殖民。市区周围有以乳用畜牧为主的农牧业，并有丰富的国有林。木材加工和乳制品制造为主要工业部门。木材输出中心。有俄勒冈大学（1872年建）。

6. 请问overinvestment agency problem该如何翻译

overinvestment agency problem.
过度投资代理问题；投资过剩代理问题

7. 天国少女尤金的结局是什么

漫画是和立人在一起了
尤金嘛继续关注咯 
(花鹿的确和立人在一起了，花鹿和她的父亲断绝了关系，她的父亲把花鹿小时和立人生活的那座岛送给了她，花鹿和立人从此就去那座岛生活。至于其他三人，当然都放弃了。路马特当上了拉吉尼尔的国王，卡诺还对立人说如果他放弃了花鹿，一定会把她抢回来，尤积最后还开车送花鹿去找立人。那个路马特的侍卫自杀而死。 听说的)

8. 天国少女 尤金 最后怎么样了

现在15已经出来了~~~呵呵~~~
放心了~~~~~~
我看完14时也特别特别紧张~~~~晚上都没睡好觉~~~~
看完15之后就放心了~~~~
尤金是不会变心的~~~~~~~~
最喜欢尤金~~~~
尤金王道~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
希望我们的尤金永远幸福~~~~~~~